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Sunday
Feb052012

What About The Good War?

Were Americans deceived into entering the Second World War?

First, was WWII a war worth fighting? Here is Pat Buchanan's view in a blog post entitled, "Did Hitler Want War?":

The German-Polish war had come out of a quarrel over a town the size of Ocean City, Md., in summer. Danzig, 95 percent German, had been severed from Germany at Versailles in violation of Woodrow Wilson’s principle of self-determination. Even British leaders thought Danzig should be returned.

Why did Warsaw not negotiate with Berlin, which was hinting at an offer of compensatory territory in Slovakia? Because the Poles had a war guarantee from Britain that, should Germany attack, Britain and her empire would come to Poland’s rescue.

But why would Britain hand an unsolicited war guarantee to a junta of Polish colonels, giving them the power to drag Britain into a second war with the most powerful nation in Europe?

Was Danzig worth a war? Unlike the 7 million Hong Kongese whom the British surrendered to Beijing, who didn’t want to go, the Danzigers were clamoring to return to Germany.

Just like WWI, WWII was a war that might have been prevented. However, the standard interpretation that Hitler had to be stopped does have a lot of facts going for it, in retrospect. Stopping Hitler at all costs was certainly Roosevelt's view. 

Alas, Roosevelt had a problem—the American people did not agree. So Roosevelt's entire foreign policy was designed to get America involved in the war. This involved forcing Japan to attack America. 

Japan was very dependent on American trade to sustain its war in China:

But while Roosevelt turned from sanctions toward measures of positive aid to Europe, in Asia his administration moved toward a more pointed use of embargoes against Japan. Japan relied heavily upon American oil and metals to supply its war effort in China. Any threat to stop those exports would have a significant impact on Japanese plans.

While I am sure that Roosevelt might have preferred to stop Japan short of war, he had to know that Japan would not stop its war and would secure new supplies in Southeast Asia. Roosevelt knew this

When the United States intercepted Japanese messages detailing plans for further expansion in Southeast Asia and reports arrived that Japanese transports were moving on southern Indochina, Roosevelt decided on a last-ditch gamble to stop Japanese expansion. He issued an order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States. Only a special license from the U.S. government could release Japanese assets to pay for American exports, including, most critically, oil. When the British and Dutch joined the oil embargo, it cut off the vital Southeast Asian sources of raw materials as well. With only a two-year supply of petroleum, Japan either had to give up the war in China or secure its own sources of supply. Japan first tried diplomacy, but negotiations with the United States failed, and Japan declared war.

Notice this part of the above quote, "United States intercepted Japanese messages detailing plans for further expansion in Southeast Asia." How did the US know this? The US government was reading private Japanese diplomatic messages. It was known to Roosevelt exactly what the Japanese government was telling its navy and its ambassadors. 

A kind of false flag operation is where you maneuver your opponent into doing what you want. By putting Japan into a situation where it must attack, it was inevitable that it would attack. (Let me add here that I am not defending Japan. Japan could have stopped its war in China at any time it wished and ended the conflict, and the rape of China. My point is that Roosevelt knew Japan would not do this, and he knew Japan would attack.) 

The evidence that Roosevelt knew an attack was coming is strong, the evidence that he knew the exact details, like the attack on Pearl Harbor, is weaker. Here is one recently released Imperial Japanese Naval communication:

On November 25, 1941 Japan’s Admiral Yamamoto sent a radio message to the group of Japanese warships that would attack Pearl Harbor on December 7. Newly released naval records prove that from November 17 to 25 the United States Navy intercepted eighty-three messages that Yamamoto sent to his carriers. Part of the November 25 message read: “...the task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow...”

I began my research on this subject unconvinced that Roosevelt knew exactly where Japan would attack. But I was convinced he knew an attack was coming. After reading the interview with Robert Stinnett, author of Simon & Schuster’s Day Of Deceit, I am not so sure. Was this a real dispatch? 

Stinnett, a naval veteran of WWII who served With George Bush, thinks that what Roosevelt did was correct:

Stinnett: A lot of people would not, but I think under the circumstances this was FDR’s only option. And, of course, this was sort of used in the Viet Nam War, you know. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was based on a provocation aimed at the North Vietnamese gunboats—something like that. That’s how President Johnson got The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed through the Congress. There was a provocation.

Stinnett continues with general  history lesson I have been giving you in detail in this series on propaganda and war: 

Stinnett: Oh, right. I know. Oh, when I speak about this with the families they just start crying about it, you know. They’re terribly upset....But, you know, it was used by President Polk in the Mexican War in 1846. And also by President Lincoln at Fort Sumter And then also, as I say, another example is Viet Nam, this Gulf of Tonkin business.

It could be a traditional military philosophy, the idea that a military has to sometimes provoke the enemy to attack, sacrifice its own soldiers, so as to unify a country for war.

Stinnett: I think so. I think you could probably trace it back to Caesar’s time.

Be sure to read the whole article if you are interested in this subject, remembering that it is from a pro-Roosevelt perspective. 

Did Roosevelt know? I am not sure, but if the intercepted messages released by Stinnett with a Freedom of Information Act request is accurate, then he did know. I am not shocked by this, are you shocked? If you have been reading this series you will not be. 

Here are some more links to examine. 

Positive

http://www.thenewamerican.com/history/american/574

Negative

http://www.straightdope.com/columns/read/1889/did-roosevelt-know-in-advance-about-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor-yet-say-nothing 

This author does not seem to be aware of the Stinnet information. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Day_of_Deceit

Or the hopefully "Neutral" Wikipedia entry:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pearl_Harbor_advance-knowledge_debate

I do not think there is any doubt the Roosevelt maneuvered Japan into attacking. It does not even seem to be in dispute by anyone. Did Roosevelt know the attack was coming to Pearl Harbor? I still do not know. In fact, it does not matter for the point I am making. Since the US populace was against another European War, they had to be manipulated into changing their mind. An attack by the Japanese fit this perfectly. 

Even the "good war" was subject to propaganda and manipulation of public opinion. The date will live in infamy, but maybe not the way Roosevelt meant.

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